All
human creatures, especially of the female sex, are apt to over-look remote
motives in favour of any present temptation: The temptation is here the
strongest imaginable: Its approaches are insensible and seducing: And a
woman easily finds, or flatters herself she shall find, certain means of
securing her reputation, and preventing all the pernicious consequences
of her pleasures. Tis necessary, therefore, that, beside the infamy
attending such licences, there shou'd be some preceding backwardness
or dread, which may prevent their first approaches, and may give the
female sex a repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties,
that have an immediate relation to that enjoyment.
Such wou'd be the reasonings of our speculative philosopher: But I am
persuaded, that if he had not a perfect knowledge of human nature, he
wou'd be apt to regard them as mere chimerical speculations, and wou'd
consider the infamy attending infidelity, and backwardness to all its
approaches, as principles that were rather to be wish'd than hop'd for in
the world. For what means, wou'd he say, of persuading mankind, that
the transgressions of conjugal duty are more infamous than any other
kind of injustice, when `tis evident they are more excusable, upon
account of the greatness of the temptation? And what possibility of
giving a backwardness to the approaches of a pleasure, to which nature
has inspir'd so strong a propensity; and a propensity that `tis absolutely
necessary in the end to comply with, for the support of the species?
But speculative reasonings, which cost so much pains to philosophers,
are often form'd by the world naturally, and without reflection: As
difficulties, which seem unsurmountable in theory, are easily got over in
practice. Those, who have an interest in the fidelity of women, naturally
disapprove of their infidelity, and all the approaches to it. Those, who
have no interest, are carried along with the stream. Education takes
possession of the ductile minds of the fair sex in their infancy. And when
a general rule of this kind is once establish'd, men are apt to extend it
beyond those principles, from which it first arose. Thus batchelors,
however debauch'd, cannot chuse but be shock'd with any instance of
lewdness or impudence in women. And tho' all these maxims have a
plain reference to generation, yet women past child-bearing have no
more privilege in this respect, than those who are in the flower of their
youth and beauty. Men have undoubtedly an implicit notion, that all
those ideas of modesty and decency have a regard to generation; since
they impose not the same laws, with the same force, on the male sex,
where that reason takes nor place. The exception is there obvious and
extensive, and founded on a remarkable difference, which produces a
clear separation and disjunction of ideas. But as the case is not the same
with regard to the different ages of women, for this reason, tho' men
know, that these notions are founded on the public interest, yet the
general rule carries us beyond the original principle, and makes us
extend the notions of modesty over the whole sex, from their earliest
infancy to their extremest old-age and infirmity.
Courage, which is the point of honour among men, derives its merit, in a
great measure, from artifice, as well as the chastity of women; tho' it has
also some foundation in nature, as we shall see afterwards.
As to the obligations which the male sex lie under, with regard to
chastity, we may observe, that according to the general notions of the
world, they bear nearly the same proportion to the obligations of women,
as the obligations of the law of nations do to those of the law of nature.
Tis contrary to the interest of civil society, that men shou'd have an entire
liberty of indulging their appetites in venereal enjoyment: But as this
interest is weaker than in the case of the female sex, the moral obligation,
arising from it, must be proportionably weaker. And to prove this we
need only appeal to the practice and sentiments of all nations and ages.
PART III
Of the other virtues and vices


SECT. I
Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices
We come now to the examination of such virtues and vices as are entirely
natural, and have no dependance on the artifice and contrivance of men.
The examination of these will conclude this system of morals.
The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or
pain; and when these sensations are remov'd, both from our thought and
feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of
desire or volition. The most immediate effects of pleasure and pain are
the propense and averse motions of the mind; which are diversified into
volition, into desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, according
as the pleasure or pain changes its situation, and becomes probable or
improbable, certain or uncertain, or is consider'd as out of our power for
the present moment. But when along with this, the objects, that cause
pleasure or pain, acquire a relation to ourselves or others; they still
continue to excite desire and aversion, grief and joy: But cause, at the
same time, the indirect passions of pride or humility, love or hatred,
which in this case have a double relation of impressions and ideas to the
pain or pleasure.
We have already observ'd, that moral distinctions depend entirely on
certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever
mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey
or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives
uneasiness, is vicious. Now since every quality in ourselves or others,
which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love; as every one, that
produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It follows, that these two
particulars are to be consider'd as equivalent, with regard to our mental
qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the
power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must
judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the
mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which
causes hatred or humility.
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, `tis only as a sign of some
quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind,
which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal
character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant
principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and
consequently are never consider'd in morality.


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   
 
  But tho' this be a very strong motive to fidelity, our philosopher wou'd quickly discover, that it wou'd not alone be sufficient to that purpose...
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